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THE "CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS" WITH THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
A STUDY IN THE ADAPTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO POLITICAL REALITIES
By JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR.
Of the New York Bar
At Paris, on October 23, 1954, the United States, the United Kingdom,
the French Republic (the "Three Powers") and the Federal Republic
of Germany, as part of the salvage operations following the collapse of
the plan for a European Defense Community, signed a Protocol on the
Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. The first article of that Protocol provides that, upon ratification by
the four signatories, the so-called Contractual Agreements with the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, originally signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952,
shall enter into force-with, however, certain amendments contained in
five Schedules to the Protocol.' Two days later, Secretary Dulles ex-
plained to the President, the other members of the Cabinet, and several
millions of anonymous television viewers:
... we approved the various agreements and documents which
had to deal with this subject of restoring German sovereignty. Rather
complicated because of the great many things that have been going on
during this past 10-year period which have got to be wound up in an
orderly way.
2
The Secretary's statement, while incontestable as far it it goes, does less
than full justice to a truly remarkable set of international agreements.
Drafted in response to an unprecedented international situation, they
create a situation which defies classification in terms of ordinary concepts
of international law. The primary aim of this supplement to Mr. Dulles'
homely remarks is less to analyze than to describe this situation, with
particular attention to the status which the Federal Republic will enjoy
under the Agreements. A secondary aim is comparison of the Agree-
ments, as signed in 1952, with those which emerged after two years of
steady growth in German power and prestige.
The Contractual Agreements include a Convention on Relations be-
tween the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany; a Con-
vention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their
Members in the Federal Republic of Germany; a Finance Convention; and
a Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the
I The full texts of the Contractual Agreements, as originally signed, are contained
in Execs. Q and R, U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., June 2, 1952. The texts of the
1954 Protocol and Amendments appear in Department of State Publication 5659, London
and Paris Agreements (November, 1954), pp. 63-122. The Protocol, as of March 15,
1955, is not in force.
2Dept. of State Publication 5659, p. 5.
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Occupation. Annexed to the Convention on Relations is the Charter of an
Arbitration Tribunal for the hearing of disputes arising under the con-
ventions, and possibly even the settlement of those disputes which involve
no important interest of the signatories.
The Contractual Agreements can more easily be understood if they are
viewed against the background of the occupation which they will replace.
That occupation, which will have completed its tenth year in May, is
nearly as unusual and interesting a study in international law and politics
as are the Agreements themselves. In general, it may be said that the
status of Western Germany immediately preceding the Agreements' entry
into force represents about the maximum of adaptation to political
exigencies possible within the limits of the traditional concept of occupa-
tion. Since 1949, when the Occupation Statute entered into effect," the
Federal Republic has in practice exercised a very large degree of sover-
eignty over its domestic and even foreign affairs. But the Three Powers
still have, in theory, all the powers which they assumed upon the collapse
of the Third Reich.4 They can veto German legislation, if it runs counter
to their policies, and they can themselves promulgate legislation in any
one of the key fields which they reserved to themselves under the Oc-
cupation Statute. They maintain a system of courts, exercising juris-
diction not only over their own personnel but also over Germans for
violations of occupation laws or offenses against the occupants. Their own
personnel enjoy complete extraterritoriality. They can requisition what
they need from the German economy. They can at any time revoke the
Occupation Statute and restore military government, however unthinkable
such a course might be in practice.
Even this occupation is sufficiently anomalous to have provoked a
good deal of academic controversy, much of it centering around the ap-
plicability of the Hague Regulations. On the whole, the controversy
radiated more heat than light. German lawyers, not unnaturally, inclined
to the view that the Hague Convention was applicable in its entirety; 5
American lawyers--especially those who had been connected with the oc-
cupation-leaned toward the proposition that Germany's unconditional
surrender reduced the Regulations to the status of a code of ethics for
occupants, so far as Germany is concerned, rather than binding rules of
international law.6 Professor Rheinstein, however, came to the conclusion
that some of the Hague Regulations were applicable to the occupation of
3 On Sept. 21, 1949, the Allied High Commission declared in force the Occupation
Statute, as promulgated on May 12, 1949; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (1949), p.
500; this JounNAL, Supp., Vol. 43 (1949), p. 172.
4 As part of the Final Act of the London Conference, on Oct. 3, the Three Powers
stated that their High Commissioners in Germany, pending the entry into effect of the
Contractual Agreements, "will not use the powers which are to be relinquished unless
in agreement with the Federal Government, except in the fields of disarmament and
demilitarisation.. ." Dept. of State Publication 5659, p. 10.
5 E.g., Laun, " The Legal Status of Germany," this JouRNAL, Vol. 45 (1951), p. 267.
6E.g., Fahy, "Legal Problems of German Occupation," 47 Michigan Law Review
(1948) 1.
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Germany as it had evolved by 1948, and some were not, those relating
to the rights and duties of the army of occupation and the status of oc-
cupation personnel falling into the former category.
7
Aluch professorial sweat and lucubration have likewise been devoted
to the essentially sterile problems of the nomenclature and classification
of the occupation-whether occupatio bellica, occupatio pacifica or, as
Professor Rheinstein suggested, occupatio ambivalens5 For American
lawyers, at least, answers to these questions for most practical purposes
were furnished by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Madsen v.
Kinhsella,9 which was concerned with the jurisdiction of a court of the
Allied High Commission for Germany after the effective date of the
Occupation Statute. Starting from the classic proposition that ". . . The
status of military government continues from the inception of the actual
occupation till the invader is expelled by force of arms, or himself
abandons his conquest, or till, under a treaty of peace, the country is
restored to its original allegiance or becomes incorporated with the domain
of the prevailing belligerent," '1 the Court had little difficulty in con-
cluding that, while American government in Germany had passed from
military to civilian hands and so had ceased, at least in name, to be
"military government," "- it continued to be "a government preseribed by
an occupying power and it depended upon the continuing military oc-
cupancy of the territory." 12
Since the proceedings at issue in the Madsen case had taken place in
1950, the Court did not consider the effect of the joint resolution of
Congress, approved by the President October 1, 1951, terminating "the
state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany,
declared by the joint resolution of Congress approved December 11,
1941." 13 It is, however, very doubtful that this unilateral action could
affect the status of Germany under international law, for its effect was
plainly intended to be limited to the domestic law of the United States,
such as the Trading with the Enemy Act. It did not purport to end the
7llheinstein, "The Legal Status of Occupied Germany," ibid., pp. 23, 27. The
Supreme Court, in deciding a case which arose after the promulgation of the Occupa-
tion Statute and which involved the question of the jurisdiction of the courts of the
occupation government, quoted Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations, which obligates the
occupant to take all measures in his power to ensure public order and safety. Madsen
v. Kinsella (1952), 343 U. S. 341, 348. The applicability of the Hague Regulations
was not in issue, and the Court may simply have regarded Art. 43 as stating the con-
sensus of opinion on customary international law.
s Rheinstein, loc. cit., at p. 33. The author, in his search for historical analogies, is
reduced to such curiosities of the ius gentium as the Austro-Hungarian Empire's
thirty-year "occupation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the medieval practice of
pledging territory to a foreign sovereign to secure an obligation.
a 343 U. S. 341 (1952) ; this JoURNAL, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 556.
10 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., 1920), p. 801.
11 Exec. Order 10062, June 6, 1949, 14 Fed. Reg. 2965.
12 343 U. S. at p. 357.
is Pub. Law 181, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; Proclamation 2950, 16 Fed. Beg. 10915; this
JouRNAi, Supp., Vol. 46 (1952), p. 13.
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OP INTERNATIONAL LAW
state of war, under international law, created by Germany's prior dec-
laration of war, but only the situation under United States law created
by the resolution of Congress. Moreover, the Proclamation explicitly
declared that
the rights, privileges and status of the United States and the other
occupation powers in Germany . . derive from the conquest of
Germany and the assumption of supreme authority by the Allies and
are not affected by the termination of the state of war.
In summary, then, it may be concluded that, however sweeping the
changes in the political situation, in strict legal theory the status of
Germany prior to the entry into force of the Agreements is essentially
what it was immediately after unconditional surrender and the evapora-
tion of the so-called "Doenitz Government." Although the Government
of the Federal Republic is (like the Communist German Democratic
Republic in the Soviet Zone of Germany) undoubtedly a de facto govern-
ment within its territorial and political area of jurisdiction, and while
(unlike the German Democratic Republic) it is a most important factor
in international politics, it derives its powers from Allied military
government, which can, again in strict legal theory, at any time and for
any reason by unilateral action resume those powers. 14  There is nothing
which would irrevocably deprive the occupants of any portion of their
supreme authority.
As above indicated, the possibilities of development within the classical
concept of occupation had been exhausted, and since 1950 it had become
increasingly obvious that I the laws of political ecology required further
evolution in the status of Western Germany. 5 The salient political facts
which led to this conclusion are obvious and may be briefly summarized:
1. Germany is presently divided between East and West; neither
the reunification of Germany nor the conclusion of a comprehensive
peace treaty is practicable until there is at least a partial settlement
of differences between the Communist countries and the democracies.
2. German public opinion makes it practically impossible for any
German or foreign politician to admit that war may be the only
alternative to a more or less permanent division of Germany and the
loss of her territories beyond the Oder.
3. Both Soviet Russia and the Western Powers desire to take ad-
vantage of the military potential of their respective parts of Germany;
and Soviet Russia, by the establishment of the para-military Volks-
polizei, has already taken a long step in that direction. From the
standpoint of the Western democracies, indeed, some soldiers doubt
that the defense of Western Europe is possible without German par-
14 See. 3 of the Occupation Statute reserves to the occupying Powers the right to
rescind the Statute.
15 "In considering the contractual agreements as a whole, it should be borne in mind
that they have had to take into account an unprecedented situation .... The problem
has posed itself of according to the Federal Republic full authority over its internal
and external affairs while preserving the means of negotiating German unity and of
maintaining the rights of the Three Powers in Berlin." Sen. Exec. Rep. 1o. 16, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Execs. Q and
R), p. 37. This problem has in nowise been diminished by events between 1952 and
the present.
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ticipation. This includes the availability of bases and similar fa-
cilities in Western Germany, as well as actual contribution of German
soldiers and arms.
4. Prudence and publie opinion in the democracies alike require
some type of guarantee against a resurgence in Germany of Naziism
or aggressive militarism.
5. A country which is sought as an ally cannot continue to be
treated as occupied enemy territory.
The Contractual Agreements represent an effort to reconcile these nearly
irreconcilable desiderata. Because they were worked out in response to a
set of novel requirements, they are calculated to be the despair of the
pundits of international law. The status of Western Germany which
would result from their entry into in effect cannot adequately be described
in terms of "sovereignty" or "occupation" (whether bellica or pacifica)
or any other terms from the lexicon of that science, though there will no
doubt be valiant efforts. They can, indeed, be comprehended only by
consideration of what they actually provide, in the light of the five re-
quirements above stated.
1. Provisions necessitated by the division of Germany and present
impossibility of a peace treaty
"In view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the
reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the
Three Powers retain the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exer-
cised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole,
including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement." The
raison d'9tre of this quotation from Article 2 of the amended Convention
on Relations is clear enough. These are rights which, vis-h-vis Soviet
Russia, could not be replaced by any agreement with a government which
the Kremlin does not recognize. The conclusion of a formal peace treaty
with the Federal Republic and total abandonment by the Western Powers
of their occupation of Germany would afford to the Soviets an excellent
legal pretext to claim that the Western Powers had not only violated the
Potsdam and other World War II agreements, but had abandoned their
right to have any further say in the fate of Germany and their right to
remain in Berlin. The legal dialecticians of the Soviet Union are rarely
at a loss for rationalizations of its realpolitik, but there is no reason un-
necessarily to simplify matters for them.
A far more difficult problem is presented by a third set of basic rights
stemming from conquest and occupation-the rights, in the words of the
1952 Convention on Relations, relating to "the stationing of armed forces
in Germany and the protection of their security." Russia is in no
position to dispute the right of the Three Powers to station their forces
in Germany as occupants, but it could, and probably will, vociferously
challenge their right to be there on no other basis than the consent of a
government which it does not recognize.
16
16 Soviet Russia's recent recognition of the "sovereignty" of the so-called German
Democratic Republic was not, of course, accompanied by any withdrawal of Russian
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The 1952 Convention dealt squarely with the problem; the right to
station forces in Germany and to protect their security was specifically
included among those retained by the Three Powers. The provisions of
the 1954 Convention are a study in the use of ambiguity as a method of
avoiding, or at any rate of postponing, the resolution of disagreement.
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 now provides that:
Pending the entry into force of the arrangements for the German
Defence Contribution, the Three Powers retain the rights, heretofore
exercised or held by them, relating to the stationing of armed forces
in the Federal Republic.
Thereafter, the matter is to be dealt with by a separate convention, ef-
fective upon the accession of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty,
whereby the Federal Republic agrees that "forces of the same nationality
and effective strength as at that time may be stationed in the Federal
Republic." 7 This, however, is followed by an effort (Article 4(2)) to
refute the inference that the Three Powers will have then abandoned their
right to station forces in Western Germany:
The rights of the Three Powers, heretofore exercised or held by
them, which relate to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and
which are retained, are not affected by the provisions of this Article
insofar as they are required for the exercise of the rights [relating to
Berlin, Germany as a whole, reunification and a peace treaty].
Is the phrase "and which are retained" a bashful affirmation of the
proposition that these rights are retained-rather than acquired by agree-
ment-even after the entry into force of the arrangements for the German
defense contribution? 'Who can say how far the retention of the right to
station armed forces in the Federal territory is essential to the exercise
of Allied rights respecting reunification and a peace treaty or the Allied
right to remain in Berlin (which is not part of the Federal Republic's
territory) ? How does this square with the antecedent unequivocal dec-
laration of paragraph 2 of Article 1 that "The Federal Republic shall
have accordingly the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal
and external affairs"? We search farther for enlightenment and find
this (Article 4, paragraph 2):
. .. In view of the status of the Federal Republic as defined in Article
1, paragraph 2 . ..and in view of the fact that the Three Powers do
not desire to exercise their rights regarding the stationing of armed
forces in the Federal Republic, insofar as it is concerned, except in
full accord with the Federal Republic, a separate Convention deals
with this matter.'
occupation forces in East Germany, nor has Russia purported to sign a peace treaty
with her East German satellite.
17 The text of the separate Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the
Federal Republic of Germany appears at pp. 94-96 of Dept. of State Publication 5659.
is The Final Act of the London Conference obligates the United Kingdom, and morally
commits the United States, to maintain armed forces in Germany, but says nothing
about their right to maintain such forces. Op. cit., p. 14.
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On balance, this highly ambivalent language seems to mean that the Three
Powers still retain their right, based on conquest and occupation, to station
armed forces in Western Germany, although it is a right which will not
be used without the consent of those who are subject to it-like the
prerogatives of the British Crown; or it may mean that, to the extent that
they have abdicated their rights, the abdication runs only in favor of the
Federal Republic; i.e., the Three Powers are, for purposes of international
law, still occupants, but West Germany is not occupied. The lawyer's
mind may boggle at such concepts; but the validity and meaning of these
provisions may never be tested seriously. Article 9(3) excludes disputes
involving these rights of the Three Powers, "or action taken thereunder,"
from the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal or of any other tribunal
or court. Thus, unless and until there arises a real crisis in relations
between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic, each party may
construe the clause to its own satisfaction, the Germans taking the position
that Allied forces are present in their territory only by grace of German
consent and the Allies taking the position-especially in discussions with
the Russians-that they are there on the same legal basis as before.
In tacit recognition that the Federal Republic cannot be universally
accepted as a new sovereign entity, despite the declaration that it will
"have the full authority of a sovereign state" (which may not be the
same thing as actually being a sovereign state), the Three Powers, under
Article 3, agree to represent its interests with international organizations
and other states, but only at the request of the Federal Republic and when
it is not in a position to do so itself. Although not explicitly so stated,
the Federal Republic is at liberty to establish and carry on normal diplo-
matic relations with any countries which will recognize it 19 and to join
any international organization to which it can gain admission. Indeed,
under the same article, the Federal Republic affirms its intention to join
"international organizations contributing to the common aims of the free
world," and the Three Powers pledge themselves to support its candidacy
''at appropriate times." 20
2. Provisions in deference to German desire for reunification
The various documents relating to the Agreements, and the Agreements
themselves, are liberally sprinkled with protestations and provisions in-
10 The Three Powers themselves, under the 1952 Convention, would have conducted
their relations with the Federal Republic through ambassadors, who were, however,
to "act jointly in matters the Three Powers consider of common concern" under the
Contractual Agreements. This provision has vanished from the convention itself-
presumably for the same reasons which induced throughout the agreements the replace-
ment of the phrase "The Three Powers and the Federal Republic" by the phrase, "The
Signatory States." There seems to be nothing to inhibit joint action in practice, and
in fact the quoted provision now appears in a tripartite agreement. Dept. of State
Publication 5659, p. 121.
20 In See. V of the Final Act of the London Conference the Three Powers declare
that "They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German
Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for
Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs." Ibid.,
p. 17.
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tended to refute any inference that either the Three Powers or the Federal
Republic are resigned to a quasi-permanent division of Germany into two
new and more or less hostile states. The Three Powers declared in the
Final Act of the London Conference that "The achievement through
peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental
goal of their policy." 21
Both Article 2 and Article 7 contain references to "Germany as a
whole," i.e., recognition that Germany, at least as she existed before
Hitler's conquests and annexations, is still an international concept, if
not an actuality; in abeyance, but not extinguished. 22 Article 7, indeed,
is almost wholly devoted to dispelling the idea that the new relationship
of the Western Powers to Western Germany marks the abandonment of
plans for reunification.23 The Three Powers and the Federal Republic
will co-operate to achieve by peaceful means a unified Germany; and the
Three Powers will "consult with" the Federal Republic on the exercise
of their (retained) rights regarding Germany as a whole.
But suppose Germany actually is unified; what then becomes of the
elaborate system of rights and duties embodied in the Contractual Agree-
ments ? The Convention on Relations does not, and probably could not,
supply an unambiguous answer. Article 7(3) of the 1952 version pro-
vided in effect that this Aew Germany would be "extended" the rights
of the Federal Republic under the Contractual Agreements (and the
EDC Treaty) upon its assumption of the Federal Republic's obligations
thereunder. Taken by itself, this would have been open to the construc-
tion that the government of the new Germany was to have a choice of
ratifying or rejecting the Federal Republic's accession to the Contractual
Agreements (and the E. D. C.); and it may be remarked in passing that
it is not very easy to conceive circumstances in which Soviet Russia would
consent to the reunification of Germany on terms which would leave the
new government any such choice. This has vanished, and the problem
is dealt with only by Article 10, which provides that the four signatories
will "review" the terms of the Contractual Agreements upon "the re-
unification of Germany, or an international understanding being reached
21 Ibid.
22 Of. Laun, "The Legal Status of Germany," this JouRNA, Vol. 45 (1951), pp.
267, 268-272. The author, a German lawyer, devotes much time, learning and ingenuity
to the elaboration of the argument that Germany, not having been formally annexed
by any of the conquerors, still exists, despite the creation of the Federal Republic and
the German Democratic Republic, and that this continued existence is recognized by
many acts of both the Western democracies and the Communist Powers, such as the
continued existence of the Quadripartite Control Authority (also in abeyance), the
many references in the legislation of the occupying Powers to "Germany as a whole"
and the reference, contained in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic
to a future Constitution (T'erfassung) to be agreed upon by the whole German nation.
2sThe 1954 amendments substitute the words "reunified" and "reunification" for
"unified" and "lunification" in a number of instances, e.g., Convention on Relations,
Arts. 7(2), 10. The psychology of this refinement is unclear; perhaps it is intended to
connote the restoration of Germany as she existed before Hitler, including East Prussia
and Silesia.
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with the participation or consent of the States parties to the present
Convention on steps towards bringing about the reunification of Germany,
or the creation of a European federation; or in any situation which all
of the Signatory States recognize has resulted from a change of a funda-
mental character" from present conditions. Thereafter they will modify
the conventions "to the extent made necessary or advisable by the funda-
mental change," but only by mutual agreement.
This implies more than it says, although the implications are far from
clear. It seems, indeed, to be founded on the premise that the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic will be the government of a reunified
Germany, and that the Federal Republic will be bound by its present
commitments, except to the extent that the Three Powers consent to their
modification.24  The United States appears to put this construction on
Article 10, for the Secretary of State's letter transmitting to the Presi-
dent the amendments to the conventions states that, in the event of review
consequent upon reunification or an international understanding on steps
toward that goal, "There must, of course, be agreement by all the sig-
natory governments to any changes made in the conventions." 25 It is
apparently not the view of the Government of the Federal Republic, whose
legal experts are reported to have taken the position that the conventions
would be "invalid and inapplicable" after German reunification.
26
These provisions appear to be essentially:
(a) Earnest declarations that the reunification of Germany remains a
basic goal;
(b) Provisions treating such reunification as a real possibility; and
(c) Provisions (the same ones) which give to the Three Powers in the
event of unification rights which they could not insist upon without
jeopardizing the prospect of removal of Soviet obstruction to reunification.
Although this essay is devoted to the genuine politico-legal problems
arising from the new relationship of Western Germany to the Western
democracies, rather than to the highly artificial relationship between the
Soviet Svengali and its East German Trilby, it should be pointed out that
the Soviet Union, while constantly emitting propaganda in favor of Ger-
man reunification, has caused the German Democratic Republic to assume
commitments much more prejudicial to the chances of peaceful reunifica-
tion, notably its formal acceptance of the Oder boundary and the con-
comitant territorial cessions to Poland and Russia. Article 7(1) of the
Convention on Relations, on the other hand, commits the democracies to the
proposition that "the final termination of the boundaries of Germany"
must await a peace settlement.
24 Disputes under Art. 10 are not among those which Art. 9 exempts from the jurisdic-
tion of the Arbitration Tribunal. Conceivably it could be argued that Art. 10 is an
agreement to agree, or at least to bargain in good faith, and that the Federal Republic
could bring before the Tribunal an arbitrary refusal by the Three Powers, or any one
of them, to consent to modifications which are reasonably necessary, or even "eadvis-
able," in the light of some fundamental change.
25 New York Times, Nov. 16, 1954, p. 12; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 31 (1954),
pp. 851-852. 26 New York Times, Dee. 21, 1954, p. 6.
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At the same time, there is a concession to the not very realistic fear
in the back of the French (and perhaps the Russian) mind that a rearmed
Germany might be tempted to launch an armed crusade for the recovery
of her lost territory, dragging her new partners with her: as part of the
Final Act of the London Conference, the Federal Republic undertook
"never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany
or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal
Republic." 27 Moreover, in the same instrument, the Three Powers stated
that they will regard as a threat to their own safety any recourse to
force which threatens the defensive character of the Atlantic Alliance,
and would consider a government which so offended as having forfeited
its right to military assistance under NATO. 28 There is also a much
more substantial concession to the much more substantial fear that the
Federal Republic might play off the West against the Soviets, bargaining
the abrogation of her commitments to the former in exchange for re-
unification and the recovery of her territories from the latter, for the
inability of the Federal Republic to modify its obligations under the
Agreements without the consent of the Three Powers means that they
cannot be excluded from any negotiations with the Soviet Union.
3. Provisions relating to Western defense
The positive satisfaction of this political exigency, i.e., arrangement for
the contribution of German manpower and mat6riel to the common defense,
is handled through the mechanism of the Brussels and North Atlantic
treaties and is beyond the scope of this article. But it was no less es-
sential to provide for the continued stationing in Germany of the forces
of the other Western Powers and to regulate the rights and duties of
such forces. This problem (which, of course, did not exist under the
occupation) had to be dealt with by the Contractual Agreements.
As noted above, the Three Powers seem to retain, under Article 4, the
right to station armed forces in Germany, although their mission is
changed from occupation, to "the defense of the free world, of which
Berlin and the Federal Republic form part." But, without the consent
of the Federal Republic, there can be no increase in the effective strength
of these forces.29  Moreover, the NATO Council, implementing the de-
cisions of the London Conference, has agreed that the location of NATO
forces, i.e., those forces of NATO countries stationed on the Continent and
under the command of SACEUR (the NATO supreme commander), is
to be determined by SACEUR "after consultation and agreement with
27 Dept. of State Publication 5659, p. 16. 28 Ibid., p. 17.
29Art. 4(2); separate Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces, Art. 1(2).
Curiously enough, Art. 5(1)(b) of the Convention on Relations provides that, "in the
event of external attack or imminent threat" thereof,. the Three Powers may bring in,
as part of their forces, contingents of the armed forces of any nation not no* pro-
viding such contingents, without the Federal Republic's consent. No such provision is
made for additional contingents of the Three Powers' own forces.
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the national authorities concerned." 80 Presumably these "national au-
thorities" include not only those of the country whose forces are concerned,
but also those of the prospective host country; but it is not clear to what
extent NATO will "recognize as suitable to remain under national com-
mand" and hence not under the authority of SACEUR,31 American,
French or British forces now stationed in Germany.
If the Three Powers are to commit very substantial forces in Germany,
and if these forces no longer have the status of occupants, a serious prob-
lem arises as to their security in the event of external attack, internal
subversion, or other situations in which martial law might be appropriate.
The 1952 Conventions dealt unambiguously with this thorny problem.
Article 5 of the Convention on Relations, 1952 version, in substance pro-
vided for a restoration of the occupation regime whenever the Three
Powers believed that the security of their forces was endangered-
whether that danger stemmed from external aggression or from such an
extreme development in German internal politics as an electoral triumph
by neo-Nazis or Communists.3 2  In such case, the Three Powers would
have had the power to "proclaim a state of emergency in the whole or any
part of the Federal Republic." This was a polite way of saying "rein-
state the occupation," for upon such a proclamation the Three Powers
were empowered to "take such measures as are necessary to maintain or
restore order and to insure the security of the Forces'--a phrase which
fairly measures the powers of a military occupant under conventional
concepts of international law.33  Moreover, Article 5(7) of the 1952
Convention on Relations would have expressly provided that, even with-
out the proclamation of a "state of emergency," any military commander
whose forces were "immediately menaced" could take whatever action,
including the use of armed force, was necessary to protect them.
Under the 1954 draft, these rights are considerably less clear-cut.
Article 5(2) now provides that:
The rights of the Three Powers, heretofore held or exercised by
them, which relate to the protection of the security of armed forces
stationed in the Federal Republic and which are temporarily retained,
shall lapse when the appropriate German authorities have obtained
similar powers under German legislation enabling them to take
effective action to protect the security of those forces, including the
-0 Dept. of State Publication 5659, pp. 32-33.
31 Tbd.
32 Art. 5(2) of the 1952 Convention on Relations defined as follows the circumstances
which would justify the Three Powers in resuming control:
C. .. an attack on the Federal Republic or Berlin, subversion of the liberal democratic
basic order, a serious disturbance of public order or a grave threat of any of these
events, and which in the opinion of the Three Powers endangers the security of their
forces . . .1
33 "Thus the occupant's rights are double-based, resting on the necessity for providing
some established government in a country which is shut off from its ordinary fountain
of justice and spring of administration, and secondly, on the military interests of the
occupying belligerent himself." Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911), p. 322. See
also Garner, International Law and the World War (1920), Vol. II, p. 77 et seq.
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ability to deal with a serious disturbance of public security and order.
To the extent that such rights continue to be exercisable they shall
be exercised only after consultation, insofar as the military situation
does not preclude such consultation, with the Federal Government and
with its agreement that the circumstances require such exercise. In
all other respects the protection of the security of those forces shall be
governed by the Forces Convention or by the provisions of the
Agreement which replaces it, and, except as otherwise provided in any
applicable agreement, by German law.
Taken literally, this provision seems to mean that the Three Powers will
"temporarily" retain the right to proclaim a "state of emergency" and,
in effect, restore military government, if they believe such actions requisite
to the security of their forces, for they certainly hold such rights as
occupants. What is not so clear is the point at which "the appropriate
German authorities" van be said to have "obtained similar powers under
German legislation enabling them to take effective action to protect the
security of those forces." The vesting in the German Federal Government
of emergency powers, similar to the powers under international law of a
conqueror's military government, raises exceedingly difficult questions of
politics and constitutional law. For example, does the "ability to deal
with a serious disturbance of public security and order" include constitu-
tional authority to set aside an election won by neo-Nazis or Communists?
Two propositions may, however, be put forward with reasonable as-
surance:
(1) The military authorities of the Three Powers will continue for the
foreseeable future to regard themselves as possessed of comprehensive
powers to deal with any emergency which they believe endangers the
security of their forces.
(2) If the questions of the extent of these powers and the point at
which they lapse should ever become more than academic, they will not
be resolved by lawyers. As is the case with the right to station forces
in Germany, disputes involving the right to protect their security, "or
action taken thereunder," are excluded by Article 9(3) from the jurisdic-
tion of the Arbitration Tribunal or any other tribunal or court.
These conclusions are pointed up by the reasons assigned for the deletion
of paragraph 7 of Article 5 which, as above noted, would have explicitly
authorized any military commander to take any action necessary to protect
his forces against an immediate threat. A "related letter" from the
German Chancellor to the United States Secretary of State a' says that
"The Federal Government is of the opinion that this is the inherent right
of any military commander according to international law and therefore
German law."
Similarly, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign
Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, even as
revised, goes farther to insure the extraterritoriality of the "foreign
forces" than would be the case under the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
34 Dept. of State Publication 5659, p. 99.
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ment.3 , Although it is to be replaced by "new arrangements setting
forth the rights and obligations of the Three Powers and other States
having forces in the territory of the Federal Republic," which are to be
"based on" the NATO Agreement ("supplemented by such provisions
as are necessary in view of the special conditions existing in regard to the
forces stationed in the Federal Republic"), 36 it is obvious that the
working out of the new agreement will not be'easy. The probability that
the Forces Convention will not be superseded for a considerable time is
strong enough to justify detailed consideration of its provisions, which
were not much altered by the 1954 Protocol.
Contrary to the situation under the NATO Agreement, the Three Powers
retain what is for all practical purposes exclusive criminal jurisdiction
over the members of their forces.37 The German authorities can arrest
members of the forces only in emergencies, and then must turn them
over promptly to their own authorities. Although the German courts are
given civil jurisdiction over members of the forces,88 they cannot restrict
their personal liberty, nor seize any personal property which the military
authorities certify as necessary for the performance of a member's duties.s 9
In other respects also, the Forces Convention confers on the Allied
Forces rights which, while much more circumscribed than those which
they have enjoyed as avowed military occupants, nevertheless go beyond
anything which a NATO Power would be likely to obtain in the territory
of another NATO Power. Thus, Article 3(3) and Annex A of the Forces
Convention in effect amend and supplement the German Penal Code by
making criminal all sorts of offenses against the forces, ranging from
-5 The text of the NATO Agreement is reproduced in Exec. T, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
June 16, 1952; also in this JouTNAL, Supp., VoL 48 (1954), p. 83. See Schwartz, "In-
ternational Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement," 53 Columbia Law Review
(1953) 1091. 36 Convention on Relations, Art. 8(1) (b).
37 Art. 6(1). Art. 6(4), however, provides for the transfer of such eases to German
jurisdiction, by agreement between the German authorities and the authorities of the
forces. The Supreme Court of the United States has said that members of an in-
vading or occupying force are "not subject during the war to the laws of the enemy or
amenable to his tribunals for offenses committed by them."2 Coleman v. Tennessee
(1879), 96 U. S. 513. Although it is by no means clear that the Supreme Court, even
in 1879, would have applied this dictum to a situation in which the occupying govern-
ment had agreed to subject members of its forces to local courts, any attempt so to
transfer to German jurisdiction a member of the United States Forces-which includes
dependents-might lead to an attempt to litigate in the American courts the question
whether the war and the occupation have been terminated for legal purposes.
35 Art. 9. It can also be argued that, at least under the American view of inter-
national law, members of an occupying force cannot be subjected even to the civil
jurisdiction of "enemy" courts. Of. Dow v. Johnson (1880), 100 U. S. 158. How-
ever, it is very doubtful that the immunity is so personal to the individual that it
cannot be waived by the authorities of the occupying government. Thus, it appears
that after World War I the American occupation authorities subjected members of their
forces to the civil jurisdiction of German courts in paternity cases. See American
Representation in Occupied Germany, 1920-1921, Vol. II, p. 60. In any case, it would
seem almost impossible to get the issue before an American court, except through a
collateral attempt to enforce the judgment of a German court.
3DArt. 10(3), (4).
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espionage and sabotage to publicly vilifying them or maliciously exposing
them to contempt,40 although the provision that the German authorities
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over offenses against the forces by
Germans 41 certainly represents a considerable derogation from the ordi-
nary authority of a military occupant.
A few further examples may be adduced, without attempting ex-
haustively to recapitulate the elaborate provisions of the convention.
The forces, their members and their vehicles, vessels and aircraft can
move into, within and out of Western Germany without restriction.42  The
forces can establish their own communications facilities so far as required
for military purposes; and this includes radio communications, despite
the scarcity of radio frequencies.48 They can conduct maneuvers and
training exercises throughout the Federal territory." Their installations
and works "directly serving the purposes of defense'"--which, presum-
ably, would include a minefield or a chain of concrete pillboxes-are to
be constructed by the Federal Republic, as needed, or if there is special
need for secrecy or security, the forces can construct them themselves.
4 5
The Three Powers can, subject to review by an impartial arbitrator, veto
on grounds of security a German decision to grant the request of a foreign
sovereign for extradition.
4
Article 30(2), not in itself of great importance, deserves special at-
tention as a type of the numerous instances in which close bargaining
between Allied and German negotiators has led to a mean between the
rights of an occupant and those of a mere visitor. It provides in essence
that in areas outside cities, if the German authorities cannot meet military
standards of purity of the water supply, the forces themselves may purify
the supply, whereas in cities there must be agreement with the municipal
authorities on standards of purification. Some knowledge of the history
of the occupation is requisite to full understanding of the significance of
this compromise. The medical corps of the Allied Armies, particularly
the American, have been strongly of the opinion that local water supplies
40 The inclusion of these detailed provisions is attributable less to Allied hypereaution
than to the fact that the Federal Republic, having no armed forces, has no legislation
dealing specifically with offenses against them. The statutes dealing with offenses
against the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich were, of course, among those repealed by the
Allies at the outset of the occupation. Otherwise it would have been enough to provide
that offenses against the forces of the Three Powers should be assimilated to offenses
against the Federal Republic's own armed forces.
41 Art. 6(3).
42Arts. 17(1), 25. This is presumably subject to the overall limitation on the
strength of such forces provided by the separate convention. See above, p. 130.
48 Art. 18(2), (5); Annex B.
44Art. 19(1). The separate convention (Art. 1(3)) permits additional forces to
enter and remain for periods up to 30 days in connection with NATO training activities,
but only with German consent.
45 Art. 20(1). Here too, however, there is a substantial subtraction from the usual
rights of an occupant, in that such measures, if they are likely to cause serious damage
to public or private property, as would often or usually be the case, are subject to
review by the Arbitration Tribunal. Art. 20(3).
46 Art. 27.
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should be chlorinated, in the interest of public health. They could and
did cite alarming instances of contamination of untreated water supplies.
The German authorities, from the polize! up to the Bundeskanzler, be-
lieved with equal fervor that chlorination was a slur upon the purity of
German water and, what was worse, ruinous to the flavor of German beer.
Trivial as the controversy might seem, it has been a source of real friction
since the inception of the occupation. Article 30(2) probably represents
the most satisfactory possible compromise, considering that most beer is
brewed in large cities and most troops are stationed outside such cities.
The Forces Convention's articles on logistics give the Allied Forces a
good deal less than the rights of an occupant and something more than the
privileges of a visitor. All property requisitioned by the forces prior to
the effective date of the convention will remain in their possession as long
as needed.47 The power to requisition will be replaced by the Federal
Republic's obligation to make available necessary accommodations, goods
and services.4 To insure the Federal Republic's ability to honor this
commitment, it obligates itself to enact legislation implementing its right
of eminent domain; pending such enactment the convention revives pro
tanto the provisions of the former laws of the Third Reich which assured
the supply of the Wehrrnacht.
49
To the extent that German supplies and services prove inadequate, the
forces may freely import their own supplies and maintenance personnel
into the Federal territory. Where this does not suffice, they may import
their own contractors, and even, in effect, assimilate them to units of the
forces 5°--a privilege not accorded, for example, to United States Forces
in France.
4. Provisions designed to insure against a revival of totalitarianism
or militarism
The problem of preventing German rearmament from getting out of
hand is outside the scope of the conventions, in either their 1952 or 1954
versions, and of this article. Indeed, Article 2 of the Protocol on the
Termination of the Occupation provides that "The rights heretofore held
or exercised [by the Three Powers] relating to the fields of disarmament
and demilitarization shall be retained and exercised by them." Control
of German rearmament is to be accomplished within the framework of the
Brussels Treaty by a series of Protocols signed at Paris contemporaneously
with the Protocol on Termination of the Occupation.5 Briefly stated, the
47Art. 48. But "rights relating to hunting and fishing heretofore requisitioned"
are to expire one month after the entry into force of the convention (Art. 46(5)). Mem-
bers of the Occupying Forces have been able to hunt the expensively conserved game of
Germany when and as they liked, subject only to the conservation regulations imposed
by their own authorities. This issue, like that of chlorination, has aroused irritation
out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance, perhaps because there are so many
Nimrods among high Allied and German officials.
4sArt. 37(1), (2). See below, p. 146. 49Art. 37(3), (4).
5oArt. 36(2), (3).
5'Dept. of State Publication 5659, pp. 37-62.
HeinOnline -- 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 139 1955
CONTR TS" F Y
, t
ti t







r ti ' ti l l i ti i t lli
t
l s t r
t ti t t ti ill i i t i i l
.47 i l
li 's li ti r ti ,
s.4S '
t t t t
i t o
t t t i i t l t i i i
l f t e ehrnwcht.49




. i i ns re inst t litarianism
t ris
e r le f r ti r r r t fr tti t f
i t i t t , i
, l
ti i t he
ent
ilit i ti ll t i i ." t l
r l r t ri f r t l i t i t e usly
ti .51




, i , i
t f ll r rti t it i tri i i rt , r s t r r
4S rt. 37(1), (2). See belo , p. 146. 49 rt. 37(3), (4).
50 rt. 36(2), ( ).
1 i tion .






















h p ob e e e a ea a en e
f ti it r t ir r
i , t i ti l . ti l t t t
r i f t t r i t ri t t l
i t l ti t t i l i
r s r r s t r
t i t li it i t
sse s ea a se es c s s e ar s c e ra o
it t r t l r i f t ti ri fl t t , t
4 48 u "r re a ng a fis i r t f r r
are o e ire e t after t e e tr i t f rce f t e ti ( rt. ( -
r f t i r l t t i l r
r s t li , s j t l t t s r n r l n i s
their a t rities. is iss e li e t t f c l ri at as ar se irritat
ou o a p opo on o s n ns c po ance, pe hap because he e a e so any
i rods a ong high llied and er an fficials.
A t. , . l w, . . A . , .
A t. , 3 .
5 t. f t t li ti , . - .
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Federal Republic, which becomes one of the Brussels Treaty Powers,
commits itself not to manufacture in its territory atomic, chemical or
biological weapons, nor (except upon recommendation of NATO, approved
by two thirds of the Brussels Treaty Powers) guided missiles, heavy war-
ships, or bomber aircraft. The Brussels Treaty Powers will establish an
"Agency for the Control of Armaments" to satisfy itself that these
undertakings are observed. These provisions are not essentially different
from those which were envisioned in 1952, save for the replacement of
E. D. C. by the Brussels Treaty mechanism.
Much more interesting is the omission of any provision explicitly deal-
ing with the danger of a revival of totalitarianism. Article 5(2) of the
1952 Convention on Relations would have made a "subversion of the
liberal democratic basic order," which in the opinion of the Three Powers
endangered the security of their forces, one of the grounds for declaration
of a state of emergency and concomitant restoration of military govern-
ment. No such explicit provision now appears. But, as noted above,
the "temporary" retention by the Three Powers of their rights relating
to the security of their forces may come to very much the same thing. A
totalitarian government of Germany might not necessarily endanger the
security of the Three Powers' forces; but the decision as to whether or
not it did would apparently be up to the Three Powers. The most that
can be said is that, so long as the Three Powers maintain in Germany
armed forces stronger than any at the disposal of German neo-Nazis or
Communists, there would be legal justification for their intervention to
prevent the accession to power of a new Hitler of the right or left.
5. Provisions designed to recognize and implement the new relationship
between the Allies and Western Germany
The problem of making official the new and radically different relation
between the conquerors and the conquered was encountered principally
in the negotiation of the Convention on Relations (and the annexed
Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal) and the Convention on the Status
of Forces. (The Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of
the War and the Occupation deals with matters which should have figured
in a peace treaty, and disposes of most of them in much the same way as
such a treaty would probably have done. The Finance Convention is es-
sentially an international bargain, not dissimilar to many struck among
the NATO Powers, concerning the size of Western Germany's monetary
contribution to the upkeep of the forces stationed in her territory for her
protection.)
As part of the Final Act of the London Conference, the Three Powers
recognized "that a great country can no longer be deprived of the rights
properly belonging to a free and democratic people." 2 Accordingly, the
Convention on Relations leads off by terminating the occupation regime,
revoking the Occupation Statute and abolishing Allied organs of govern-
52 Dept. of State Publication 5659, p. 10.
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ment in Western Germany." It then states flatly that "The Federal
Republic shall have accordingly the full authority of a sovereign State
over its internal and external affairs." 54 Although, as has been pointed
out above, this resounding declaration is somewhat qualified by succeeding
provisions, the limitations on German sovereignty are certainly held to a
minimum.
The limits on the sovereignty of the Federal Republic over its external
affairs are mainly either those implicit in the fact that no final treaty
of peace can be concluded,5  or such as any sovereign nation may by treaty
with its equals impose upon itself. The Federal Government's various
obligations under the conventions to enact, or not to repeal, certain legisla-
tion, would, when taken in conjunction with the enforcement powers
which the Arbitration Tribunal had under the 1952 conventions, have con-
stituted a real limitation on its sovereignty in domestic matters. For
example, there has been mentioned in connection with the Forces Con-
vention the obligation of the Federal Republic to enact certain legislation
necessary to the fulfillment of its obligations to the forces. To select
another example, it has committed itself, under the Convention on the
Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, not to
repeal or amend, without the consent of the Three Powers, certain legisla-
tion of the Allied High Commission dealing with reparations. 6 Allied
laws providing for the breakup of certain industrial cartels (although
fewer of them than in the 1952 version of that convention) are to be
maintained in force until their purposes have been achieved.sr Other
provisions deal with such matters as the disposition of German war crim-
inals and other persons sentenced by Allied tribunals, s the restitution of
foreign property stolen by the Nazis,5 9 and the protection of foreign
interests in Germany, 0 and there is a general provision that:
Legislation . . . which is required to be maintained in force [by any
of the conventions] may only be amended or repealed with the consent
of the Three Powers21
The Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal would, in its 1952 version,
have put real teeth in these restrictions on German sovereignty, for that
body was given extraordinary powers to enforce the provisions of the
treaties. Specifically, it was empowered, if a party failed to "issue legal
provisions" required under the conventions, to incorporate in its judgment
"provisions, not inconsistent with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic,
creating rights and obligations for all persons and authorities in the
53 Art. 1(1). 54 Art. 1(2).
5s "The problem has posed itself of according to the Federal Republic full authority
over its internal and external affairs while preserving the means of negotiating German
unity and of maintaining the rights of the Three Powers in Berlin." Sen. Exec. Rep.
No. 16, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 37.
56 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupa-
tion, Ch. 6, Art. 2. s7 Idem, Ch. 1, Arts. 9, 11.
rs Ch. 1, Arts. 6, 7. 59 Oh. 5.
eo Ch. 10. 61 Ch. 1, Art. 1.
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Federal territory," 62 i.e., having the force of a statute. Moreover, if it
had found an Act of the German legislature to be in conflict with the
conventions, it could have declared it "null, in whole or in part, in the
Federal territory." 63
This bold attempt to break new ground in the enforcement of obliga-
tions among nations, dismissed by Secretary Dulles as "not normal to a
body created to arbitrate disputes between sovereign states," 04 has
vanished without a trace and been replaced with a provision which is, even
by the standards of past efforts to enforce treaties, of almost unique
futility. Article 11(2) of the Charter now reads, verbatim ac Zitteratim:
If a Signatory State required by a decision of the Tribunal to take
action to give effect to that decision is unable, or fails, to take such
action within the time specified by the Tribunal, or if no time is
specified, within a reasonable time, then that State, or any other Sig-
natory State a party to the dispute, may apply to the Tribunal for a
further decision as to alternative action to be taken by the defaulting
State.
The decision as to alternative action would presumably be subject to the
same provision, and so on ad infinitum.
The Federal Republic is not even under a moral obligation to refrain
from repealing or amending such legislation of the Occupying Authorities
as is not specifically covered by the conventions. Legislation of the long
dormant Quadripartite Control Council presented more of a problem, for
the Three Powers could not well permit the Federal Republic to repeal
what they could not themselves, without Soviet participation, formally
repeal. They do, however, delegate to the Federal Republic the power
(exercised by themselves since the collapse of quadripartite government of
the occupied territory) to "deprive of effect" such legislation after
"consultation" with the Three Powers.66 Perhaps the distinction between
killing a statute by repeal and throwing it into a cataleptic state by "de-
priving it of effect" has conceptual validity; but it is not likely to make
much practical difference.
Such restrictions as exist on the Federal Republic's sovereignty over
its domestic affairs are thus dependent on whatever moral sanction may
attach to a decision by the Arbitration Tribunal. The Charter of that
court contains genuine recognition of German claims to be placed on a
footing of equality.
The composition of the Tribunal ensures its impartiality-three Germans,
three Allies and three "neutrals." 6 7  If anything, the Germans have the
62 Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal (Annex B to the Convention on Relations,
1952), Art. 11(6). O6 Idem , Art. 11(3).
64New York Times, Nov. 16, 1954, p. 12; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 31 (1954),
p. 851.
65 Convention on Settlement, etc., Ch. 1, Art. 1(1).
ea Ch. 1, Art. 1(2).
67 "Neutral members," who cannot be either Germans or nationals of any of the
Three Powers, are to be appointed by agreement between the Federal Republic and the
Three Powers or, in default of such agreement, by the President of the International
Court of Justice. Charter, Art. 1(2), (3).
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better of it, for the German members would be more likely to vote as
a bloc than would the members appointed by the Three Powers. In all
other respects the Federal Republic and the Three Powers stand on a
footing of equality before the Tribunal, so far as its jurisdiction extends.
To the scope of that jurisdiction there are two major exceptions. In the
first place, certain disputes between the Federal Republic and the Three
Powers are excluded from the Tribunal's competence by provisions of
the conventions themselves. The most important such exceptions are
disputes involving the rights of the Three Powers with respect to Berlin
and Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a
peace settlement; their rights relating to the stationing of armed forces
in the Federal Republic (pending the entry into force of the arrangements
for a German defense contribution and thereafter insofar as they are
necessary to the exercise of rights respecting Berlin, reunification and
the peace treaty) ; and their rights relating to the protection of the se-
curity of their armed forces in the Federal territory. 8 Not only are
disputes involving these rights exempted, but also disputes involving
action taken under the provisions relating to these rights. The precise
wording of these exceptions deserves (and undoubtedly got from the ne-
gotiators) the most concentrated attention, for it appears to be intended
to exclude the Arbitration Tribunal from even passing on its own jurisdic-
tion over a dispute arising from an action which the Three Powers assert
to be an exercise of these rights.
The Tribunal has jurisdiction only over disputes arising "under the
provisions" of the conventions.6 9 The Three Powers would undoubtedly
take the position that a dispute as to the scope of the retained powers does
not arise "under" that or any other article, for the rights themselves
are not conferred by the convention-it merely recites their retention.
Moreover, the mere assertion by the Three Powers that a particular action
was an exercise of these rights would ipso facto "involve" these rights in
the dispute. The same consideration would apply to the propriety of
measures taken by the Three Powers in the exercise of their right to
protect the security of their armed forces stationed in the Federal territory.
A few other Allied actions are immune from review by the Arbitration
Tribunal, the most significant probably being the exercise-or non-exercise
-by the Power which tried and sentenced a war criminal of its exclusive
prerogative to terminate or reduce that sentence.70
The Convention on Relations complements its revocation of the Oc-
cupation Statute by a declaration 71 that the mission of the Three Powers'
armed forces stationed in the Federal territory "will be the defence of
the free world, of which Berlin and the Federal Republic form part."
This announced change of mission, from occupation to defense, is imple-
68 Convention on Relations, Art. 9(3). 69 Charter, Art. 9(1).
70 Convention on Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation,
Ch. 1, Art. 6. The Power in question is bound to follow a unanimous recommendation
of the Mixed Board set up to review such cases, but that Board includes a representative
of each of the Three Powers. 71 Art. 4(1).
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mented by the Forces Convention which, while devoted to matters con-
siderably less fundamental than those dealt with in the Convention on
Relations, regulates those aspects of the Allied-German relationship which
impinge most acutely on the consciousness of the average German. His
relationship with the Allied Armed Forces, which are the highly visible
symbols of their countries, will be the touchstone by which he judges
how much substance there is to the concept of equal partnership between
his country and the Western democracies.
It has been pointed out in a preceding section that the Allied Forces
would, under the Forces Convention, occupy a more favored position than
would, for example, the forces of one NATO Power in the territory of
another. But their position is, on the whole, still farther removed from
that of a military occupant, who can, generally speaking, take in the
occupied territory any measures which can be justified on grounds of
security, furthering the accomplishment of its mission, or the maintenance
of public order. Although it is impossible within the scope of this
article to recapitulate the provisions of the Forces Convention, it is il-
luminating to abstract a few of its provisions which deviate most sig-
nificantly from the rights normally exercised by a military occupant.
Except as the conventions may otherwise provide, the members of the
forces are to observe German law, and the forces are to be responsible
that it is enforced against them.72  Moreover, as the single exception to
the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the Three Powers over the members
of their armed forces, if for any reason the courts-martial of the Power
concerned lack criminal jurisdiction over a member who has committed
against Germans an act which is a crime under German law, a German
court may try him and, upon conviction, sentence him to imprisonment in
a German jail.73 These provisions, however strongly they emphasize the
"guest" status of the quondam occupants, are mainly declarations of
principle emphasizing the abrogation of the absolute rule that members of
an occupying force are exempt from the criminal jurisdiction of the courts
of the occupied territory,74 for the German authorities are bound to abstain
from prosecuting any such case in which German law gives them discretion
to abstain, or in which the offender has been suitably punished by the
disciplinary action of the forces, 75 although, in the latter case, the adequacy
of the punishment would be subject to review by the Arbitration Tribunal.
Moreover, so far as the United States is concerned, it is difficult to conceive
of a violation of German law, so serious that disciplinary punishment under
Article of War 15 would be inadequate,76 which would not also violate
one or another of the Articles of War, if only that which denounces "all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
72 Art. 2 (1). 7 Art. 6(2), (5).
74 See note 37 above. 75 Art. 6(2) (b).
76 Such punishments, imposed by commanding officers for "minor offenses" not
warranting a court-martial, include withholding of privileges, restriction to limits,
and forfeiture of half a month's pay (in the case of officers) or reduction to the next
inferior grade (in the case of enlisted men). The Articles of War appear at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 551-736.
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forces. . .. ." 77 The same comment applies to the obligation of the Three
Powers to prosecute offenses by members of the forces against Germans
as vigorously as offenses against their own personnel, for this would be
their responsibility in any case, both as part of their obligation to maintain
public order and safety and in the interest of preserving the discipline of
their forces. Similarly, the surrender by the Three Powers of their
jurisdiction to try offenses against their forces by Germans and other
persons subject to German jurisdiction underscores the end of the oc-
cupation but does not mark a great departure from the practice which
has for some time prevailed.
78
Of much greater practical effect is the subjection of members of the
77 Art. of War 134. See Manual for Courts-martial, United States (1951), p. 383.
A complex jurisdictional problem might arise where a member of the forces commits
a serious offense against German law and is discharged before apprehension. If he
were a member of the United States Forces and the offense were punishable by im-
prisonment for 5 years or more, he could probably be subjected to the jurisdiction of
a court-martial under Art. of War 3; but the Germans could probably also claim
jurisdiction, since he is no longer a member of the forces and since Art. 3(2) of Ch.
One of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the
Occupation, which deprives German courts of jurisdiction of acts of which they would
not have had jurisdiction at the time of commission, applies only to those acts antedating
the entry into force of the convention.
78 Art. 6(5) provides in substance that the Germans may transfer to the authorities
of the forces, with their consent, jurisdiction in cases in which an offender against the
forces is, although subject to German jurisdiction, not a German; e.g., a Russian
saboteur or spy whose trial might embarrass the Federal Republic. It is not entirely
clear that an American court-martial would have adequate jurisdiction in such a case.
Art. of 'War 2(12) gives to courts-martial, subject to the provisions of any treaty to
which the United States is a party, jurisdiction over "all persons within an area leased
by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States" outside its
territories and possessions, but this could hardly include any territory in Germany save,
perhaps, the precincts of a military installation. Art. of War 106 gives general courts-
niartial and military commissions jurisdiction over "any person who in time of war
is found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, vessel, or aircraft,
within the control or jurisdiction of any of the armed forces of the United States . . .
or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid of the prosecution of the war
by the United States, or elsewhere. . . .' The 1951 Manual for Courts-martial states
(at p. 341) that it is necessary to prove intent to communicate information to the
"hostile party" or "cenemy." Assuming that, for this purpose, "time of war" will
continue until the conclusion of a formal peace treaty with Germany, a question arises
as to whether the Soviet Union and its satellites could, for the purposes of the article,
be considered the "enemy" or even "the hostile party." The same problem arises
with Art. of War 104, "Aiding the Enemy." The Three Powers are, however, per-
mitted to maintain in the Federal Territory "tribunals exercising jurisdiction as con-
templated" by any of the conventions. Convention on the Settlement of Matters
Arising out of the War and the Occupation, Ch. 1, Art. 4(1). If it were concluded
that a court-martial, applying the Articles of War, could not deal adequately with such
an offense, recourse might be had to a military commission, whose jurisdiction to protect
the security of forces under the command of the authority which appoints it is, while
not clearly defined, less circumscribed than that of a court-martial. See Fairman, The
Law of Martial Rule (2d ed., 1943), pp. 265 ff., 271 ff. On the other hand, if a
German court attempted to try a member of the Soviet forces, he could argue that his
government has never terminated its status as a military occupant of Western Germany
and that he is, as a matter of international law, immune to the jurisdiction of a German
court.
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forces to German civil jurisdiction, the most obvious effect of which will
probably be a rash of automobile and paternity litigation.0 There is
not even absolute immunity from suit for acts committed in the course of
their official duty, for the German courts are bound to give to that fact
only "such legal weight and effect as it is entitled to under German
law." 10 Under a military occupation, such acts would, it goes without
saying, be entirely exempt from the jurisdiction of the local courts.81
The right to requisition, a major incident of occupation, has been
abolished and replaced by the Federal Republic's commitment to ensure
that the forces' requirements will be met 82 -a commitment which is limited
to the fulfillment of the defensive mission of the forces and which in other
respects is closely circumscribed. Goods, materials and services do not,
under present conditions, present a serious problem, except perhaps in
the case of the French forces. Sales to the British and American forces
for sterling or dollars constitute, in effect, substantial export items and as
such axe not likely to cause pain to the Federal Republic. To the extent,
however, that there may be competition between the forces and the civilian
economy for items in short supply, the matter would be regulated by a
Joint Supply Board, with Allied and German representation, which is
responsible for formulating procurement programs.
8 3
Such a squeeze actually does exist in the matter of "accommodations,"
meaning housing and real estate; not only is housing still inadequate, but
the requirements of the forces for maneuver areas place a severe strain on
Western Germany's limited supply of farmland. The Three Powers
would, as noted above, keep what they have; but additional "accommoda-
tions" would be pretty much in the discretion of the Germans, for the
requirements which the Federal Republic is obligated to fill are those
"agreed" by the forces and the Federal Government. 4 Unlike the case
of goods and services, there is no provision for a Joint Board, and the
Three Powers would seem to have no recourse from German refusal to
agree save an appeal to the Arbitration Tribunal, based on a contention
that the refusal was arbitrary and unreasonable-a contention which the
Tribunal, whose members are to be eminent lawyers rather than soldiers,8
might find it a puzzle to adjudicate.
The forces have retained the right to contract directly with German sup-
pliers of goods and materials, 8 but labor is to be obtained through the
German authorities, who set the terms and conditions of employment, in-
eluding wages.8 7 Moreover, no duties even remotely para-military may
be assigned to German employees.88
Many other provisions of lesser importance, e.g., the subjection of the
79 Art. 17(7) requires that members of the forces obey the requirements of German
law as to liability insurance on their private vehicles, although they may insure with
any company, German or otherwise, which can pay Deutschemark claims.
sArt. 16(3). 8lDow u. Johnson (1879), 100 U. S. 158.
82 Art. 37. The question of payment for such requirements is left to the Finance
Convention. 83 Art. 39.
84Art. 38(2). 85 Charter, Art. 1.
86 Art. 39(5). 87Art. 44(1), (5), (7).
s Art. 44(2), Art. 45.
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forces to German excise taxes on certain commodities purchased by them
from German producers, 89 might be adduced in support of the proposition
that the privileges of the forces will be drastically deflated under the
Forces Convention, but the point has been labored sufficiently. No doubt
the Federal Republic will now press for the application of the whole
NATO Status of Forces Agreement to the forces of the Three Powers
stationed in its territory. But from the standpoint of the Three Powers,
there is not much water to be squeezed out of the present convention.
Domestic political considerations would make it exceedingly difficult for
any of them, and especially for France, to concede, for example, the
exercise of any form of German criminal jurisdiction over members of
their forces. The United States, prior to the NATO Agreement, had
traditionally asserted exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its armed forces,
even when visiting the territory of a friendly Power,90 and the Congres-
sional uproar which greeted even that agreement's partial cession of
criminal jurisdiction over a comparatively small number of American
troops might well deter repetition of the experiment on a larger scale.
And the Three Powers may argue, with considerable justification, that the
NATO Agreement was never designed to meet the problems presented by
the stationing of forces in the territory of another Power in such numbers,
or in positions so near the forces of a potential aggressor, as is the case
in Western Germany.
It would be profitless to pose, and very hard to answer, the question
as to what the legal status of Western Germany will be under the Con-
tractual Agreements. Vis-A-vis the Soviet Union, surely, the Three Powers
must still claim the status of occupants of Germany, as the Soviet Union
(despite its purported grant of sovereignty to the German Democratic
Republic) claims it vis-A-vis them. It will be noted that the conventions
"terminate the Occupation regime" ", but do not announce the end of the
occupation itself, and, as already pointed out, the Three Powers explicitly
state that they retain---not acquire under the conventions-those rights of
an occupant which are essential in their relations with the Soviet Union
and its East German satellite. They cannot thus be said to have volun-
tarily terminated their occupation. On the other hand, they would bind
themselves, as solemnly and firmly as is possible to sovereign states, to
exercise no other rights of occupation, save in stated extraordinary circum-
stances. The result, if taxonomy were essential in the circumstances,
might be described as an occupation limited by contract. It seems to be
without precedent in international law. Nor is this surprising, for the
Contractual Agreements represent an effort to tailor a relationship among
nations to a set of circumstances without precedent in history. In inter-
national law, as in other fields of law, this is how precedents are made.
89Art. 33(1) (a). The U. S. forces, at least, are unlikely to purchase within Germany
tobacco, coffee, tea or sugar, but coal and alcohol, and possibly gasoline, might be
procured from German sources.
oSee King, "Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Forces," this JounaxA, Vol. 36
(1942), p. 539. 91 Convention on Relations, Art. 1(1).
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